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Clare: Estate Taxation - Life Insurance - Inclusion in Gross Estate If P

ESTATE TAXATION-Life Insurance-inclusion in Gross Estate if Purchased
by a Trust with Money Given It by Decedent in Contemplation of Death.
Detroit Bank and Trust Co. v. U.S., 467 F.2d 964 (6th Cir. 1972).

On April 9, 1964, Fred W. Ritter, in apparent good
health, entered into a trust agreement with the Detroit Bank
and Trust Co. He transferred $9,600 to the bank as trustee,
naming his children as beneficiaries. The trust acquired
$100,000 of insurance on Ritter's life. The trust was irrevocable and beyond Ritter's control except that he could continue to make contributions to the trust for the payment of
future premiums on the insurance policy. Ritter died six
months later on October 6, 1964. The parties stipulated that
the $9,600 paid to the trust was presumed to have been given
in contemplation of death under Section 2035 of the Internal
Revenue Code.' The dispute in this case centered on the
amount to be included in the decedent's gross estate for estate
tax purposes. The federal district court held that only the
amount of the premiums paid in contemplation of death
should be included. The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed and held that a gift of money, made in contemplation
of death, used to pay the premiums on an insurance policy
acquired within three years of death, was to be valued, for
federal estate tax purposes, in terms of the proceeds at death
rather than the amount of the premiums paid.'
The first federal estate tax statute completely omitted
life insurance from its provisions.4 This meant that the proceeds from a life insurance policy were included in decedent's
gross estate only if they were paid to the estate itself, instead
of to some designated benificiary. People could avoid paying
estate taxes by converting their estate assets into life insurance policies payable to specific beneficiaries. In fact, insurance companies "openly urged persons of wealth to take out
additional insurance payable to specific beneficiaries for the
1. INT. REV. CODE of 1954,
2. For a discussion of this
Premiums by Insured, 38
3. Detroit Bank and Trust
1972).
4.

§ 2035.
unreported case see New Danger for Payment of
J. TAXATION 7 (1973).
Company v. United States, 467 F.2d 964 (6th Cir.

INT. REV. CODE of 1916.
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reason that such insurance would not be included in the gross
5
estate. "'
In 1918, Congress moved to stop this mode of tax avoidance.' They redefnied gross income to include amounts received by the estate or by the beneficiaries under policies
"taken out by the decedent" upon his own life.' Because of
its ambiguity, the phrase "taken out by the decedent" produced nothing but confusion. The Treasury Department
added to this chaos by issuing regulation after regulation
which reconstrued the meaning of the phrase.'
Congress finally intervened in 1939 by eliminating the
words "taken out by the decedent." In their place, Congress
enacted legislation which provided that proceeds payable to
designated beneficiaries would be included in the decedent's
gross estate if the decedent had either (1) paid the premiums
on the policy directly or indirectly,9 or (2) possessed incidents
of ownership in the policy at the time of his death.'" These
enactments became known as the "premiums paid" test and
as the "incidents of ownership" test.
Under the premiums paid test, insurance proceeds purchased with assets directly or indirectly coming from the
decedent, would have been included in his gross estate in the
proportion that the amount of the premiums paid by the decedent bore to the total premiums paid." For example, if a
decedent paid directly or indirectly $20,000 out of $25,000
total premiums on a $100,000 insurance policy, $80,000 of the
proceeds would be included in his estate. Yet, the interpretation of what constituted an indirect payment of premiums by
the decedent became the subject of litigation with differing
results. At times an unrestricted gift of money used by the
donee to pay the premiums on a policy covering the donor's
life constituted indirect payments, at other times it did not. 2
5. H.R. REP. NO. 767, 65th Cong., 2d Sess. 22 (1918).
6. John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Company v. Helvering, 128 F.2d 745
(D.C. Cir. 1942).
7.
8.

INT. REV. CODE of 1918, § 402(f).
Eisenstein, Estate Taxes and the Higher Learning of the Supreme Court, 3

TAX L. REv. 395, 513-36 (1948).
9. INT. REV. CODE of 1939, § 811(g) (2).
10.

Id.

11. H.R. REP. No. 2333, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 57 (1942).
12. Estate of Showers v. Commissioner, 14 T.C. 902 (1950); Estate of Selling
v. Commissioner, 24 T.C. 191 (1955).
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While retaining the incidents of ownership test, the 1954
Code eliminated the premiums paid test. 3 Under Section 2042
of this Code, the insured could pay the premiums himself yet
keep the proceeds of the policy out of his estate by placing
the incidents of ownership in someone else. 1'4 In 1957, the
Treasury Department attempted to reintroduce a modified
form of the premium payment test into the Code. This attempt was rejected by Congress.1 5 The Department then decided to do administratively what it could not do legislatively.
It revived the premium payment test with Revenue Ruling
67-463.6 However, this ruling was in connection with Section
2035 of the 1954 Code which deals with transactions in contemplation of death and not with Section 2042 which deals
with the inclusion of life insurance in the decedent's estate.
This premium payment test was identical to the 1939 Code
test except for the three year limitation set forth by the contemplation of death provisions.
According to Revenue Ruling 67-643, the amount of
proceeds, included in the decedent's gross estate, was to be
determined by the ratio that premium payments, made during
the three years prior to death, had to the total amount of
premiums paid. 7 For example, if the proceeds of the policy
were $100,000 and twelve equal annual premium payments
had been made, three of them during the three years immediately preceding the decedent's death, 1/4 of the proceeds,
or $25,000 would be included in his gross estate.
In 1968, a district court in Michigan became the first
court to hear a case involving this revenue ruling. In Gorman
v. United States,1 8 the deceased had taken out an insurance
policy naming his wife as beneficiary and owner. He died
nine months later after paying all of the premiums on the
policy. The court concluded that Revenue Ruling 67-643 was
unfounded in either statute or case law and that any reliance
placed upon this ruling should be rejected. 9 Only the amount
13. INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 2042.
14. BIrTKER & STONE, FEDERAL INCOME ESTATE AND GIF
ed. 1972).
15. H.R. REP. No. 8381, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. 56 (1957).
16. Rev. Rul. 67-463, 1967-2 CuM. BULL. 327.
17. Id. at 329.
18. 288 F. Supp. 225 (S.D. Mich. 1968).
19. Id. at 228.
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of the premium payments made in contemplation of death
were included in the estate.
A year later, the tax court heard its first case concerning
the revenue ruling. In Estate of Inez Coleman,2" the decedent's children had taken out and at all times had owned a
policy on the decedent's life. The decedent paid the premiums
on the policy and died over three years after the policy had
been purchased. The court held against the revenue ruling
and included only the premiums paid in contemplation of
death in the decedent's estate.2' After this, the Fifth Circuit
became the first circuit court to hear the issue. In First National Bank of Midland, Texas,2 an insurance company issued a policy to the beneficiary-owner on the life of the decedent. The decedent paid the premiums dying eight years
after the policy was issued. Once again, this court ruled that
only the premiums paid in contemplation of death were includable in the decedent's gross estate.2 3
Subsequent to these cases, a federal district court in
Michigan first heard the case under consideration. 4 Following the Gorman decision, this court ruled that only the premiurns paid in contemplation of death were to be included in
the gross estate. Upon appeal, however, the circuit court
noted that two things had occurred between the time the
lower court had heard this case and the time the appeal had
been brought."5
First of all the Treasury Department had revoked Revenue Ruling 67-463 replacing it with Revenue Ruling 71-497."e
Under this new revenue ruling, the Department acquiesced in
the Coleman and Midland decisions. It said that the proceeds
of any policy on the decedent's life would not be included in
his gross estate if the policy had been owned by another
7
person for at least three years prior to the decedent's death.1
20. 52 T.C. 921 (1969).
21. Id. at 924.
22. First National Bank of Midland, Texas v. United States, 423 F.2d 1286
(5th Cir. 1970).
23. Id. at 1289.
24.

New Danger for Payment of Premiums by Insured, supra note 2.

25. Detroit Bank and Trust Company v. United States, supra note 3, at 967.
26. Rev. Rul. 71-497, 1971-2 CuM. BULL. 329.
27. Id. at 330.
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However, the Department would not go along with the Gorman decision. The ruling gives the situation of a person
buying an accidental death insurance policy and designating
his children as both owners and beneficiaries. If he dies nine
months later after paying all of the premiums, the Service
would include the entire proceeds in his gross estate. In other
words, if the policy is taken out less than three years prior
to the insured's death, the entire proceeds will be included
in his estate if he has paid the premiums on the policy. If
the policy is taken out more than three years prior to his
death, only the premiums paid in contemplation of death will
be included."
Revenue Ruling 71-497 is based solely on the 1929 case of
Chase National Bank v. United States."9 In this case the
Supreme Court had said that the word "transfer," as it was
used to value the gift made, could not be taken in a
restricted sense as to refer only to the passing of
particular items of property directly from the decedent to the transferee. It must ... include the trans-

fer of property procured through expenditures by
the decedent with the purpose, effected at death, of
having it pass to another."
Thus the service reasoned that by paying the premiums on
the policy, the decedent had not just made a gift of these
premiums but had made a gift of insurance protection. This
was a transfer of an interest in the policy which changed at
death into the proceeds of the policy."
Secondly, the service had won its first appellate court
case covering this issue. In Bel v. United States, the decedent
had died within one year after purchasing a policy on his life
naming his children as beneficiaries and owners. He had paid
all of the premiums on the policy. Relying on the Chase
National Bank decision, the court said that there was more
than mere money transferred by the decedent. He had
"beamed" the policy to his children and had created in his
children all of the contractual rights to the insurance bene28. Id.
29. 278 U.S. 827 (1929).
80. Id. at 337.
31. Rev. Rul. 71-497, supra note 26, at 330.
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fits. Thus, in effect, he had transferred the policy and, as
this transfer was in contemplation of death, all of the proceeds were includable in his gross estate.2
Using these two recent developments, as well as the conclusion that the omission of the premium payment test from
Section 2042 did not preclude its use under Section 2035, the
appellate court in Detroit Bank and Trust Co. held to reverse
the district court.8
It is submitted that the court's decision should not be
based upon Revenue Ruling 71-497, the nature of the gift
transferred, or the purpose of Congress in enacting Sections
2042 and 2035.
At best, the reliance on Revenue Ruling 71-497 is tenuous.
This Ruling is based exclusively upon the Chase case. Chase
was decided in 1929 before the premium payments test had
even been devised. The issue before the court was whether
the estate tax could cover insurance policies taken out and
owned by the decedent but payable to his wife. 4 The court
was concerned with the constitutionality of the estate tax law
and not with the relationship between premiums and proceeds.
Chase was used as main support for Revenue Ruling 67463. The courts in deciding cases under this ruling noted the
discrepancy in the factors underlying the Chase decision and
in the factual situations to which the Service tried to apply
it."5 If Chase were decided today, the decision would be the
same as it was in 1929. As the decedent had retained all of
the incidents of ownership in the policy, at his death the
proceeds would be included in his estate under the incidents
of ownership test.3 6 The relevancy of the decision in Chase as
applied to the situation in our case istherefore highly questionable.
Under Section 2035 of the Code, gifts in contemplation of
death are included in the decedent's gross estate only to the
extent of the interest he has transferred. 7 It is the value of
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.

452 F.2d 683, 691 (5th Cir. 1971).
Detroit Bank and Trust Company v. United States, supra note 3, at 969.
Chase National Bank v. United States, supra note 29, at 333.
Gorman v. United States, supra note 18, at 228.
INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 2042(a) (2) (A).
INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 2035.
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this interest that is added back into the estate. Bel concerned
itself mainly with determining exactly what interest the decedent had transferred. The court in Bel held that the decedent had "beamed" the policy to the beneficiaries; that
without the decedent's conception, guidance and payment, the
proceeds would never have reached the beneficiaries." Yet
it is dubious whether a decedent can transfer what he did not
own. At no time did the decedent have any incidents of ownership in the policy. He could not cancel or assign the policy.
He could not borrow against it or change the beneficiary.
He had absolutely no economic interest in the policy. At all
times, these interests were located in the owner of the policy
and not in the decedent. These interests were therefore
neither transferred nor transferrable by the decedent.
If a person purchases a policy and later gives it to
another, the law is clear that the interest he has transferred
is the policy itself. If this transfer has been made in contemplation of death, the entire proceeds will be included in the
deceased's estate.8 9 However, if a person gives a gift of
money, and the recipient entirely on his own purchases the
policy, then the only interest the donor has transferred is the
monetary gift. If this gift was made in contemplation of
death, only the gift itself will be included in the deceased's
estate.4" Detroit Bank and Trust, falls between the two extremes of a money gift or a gift of a policy. Which situation
it more closely resembles is the problem to be determined.
In this regard, it should be noted that the courts prior to
DetroitBank and Trust had looked to the named owner on the
policy to determine initial ownership. Thus, the court in
Gorman ignored the fact that it was the decedent himself
who had filled out and signed the application for the policy
and that he was required to take two physical examinations
before the policy could be issued. As the wife was the named
owner on the policy, she was considered to be the one who had
purchased the policy irregardless of the preliminary requirements met by the husband. In other words, there was no
38. Bel v. United States, supra note 32, at 691.
39. Vanderlip v. Commissioner, 155 F.2d 152 (2d Cir. 1946).
40. See Humphrey's Estate v. Commissioner, 162 F.2d 1 (5th Cir. 1947).
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transfer of a policy between a husband and wife if the wife
was the named owner of the policy at the time it was issued.
If the decedent had transferred more than just the
premium payment, it would seem that this something extra
would also be included in his gift tax liability. Yet, the
premium payment is the only amount that has been transferred for gift tax purposes. Under the gift tax regulations,
if the insured pays a premium on a policy that he does not
own, he has made a gift only to the extent of the premium
paid."' There seems to be very little basis in law or reason
for saying that the decedent has transferred more than the
money gift.
The court in Detroit Bank and Trust came to the conclusion that by omitting the premium payment test from
Section 2042, Congress did not intend to have it precluded
from Section 2035 also. The court stated that
it appears to us that the congressional purpose was
clearly to sweep into the estate tax, gifts of insurance
made in contemplation of death and to value such
gifts in terms of the transfer of the proceeds at death
rather than at the purchase or premium cost.4"
However in looking at the history behind the congressional
action, this statement is hard to justify.
When Congress abolished the premium payment test, by
enacting Section 2042 in 1954, it forbad the inclusion of any
portion of the proceeds of life insurance based upon the
premiums paid. The House Ways and Means Committee
justified the elimination of the premium payment test on
the ground that life insurance should be treated the same as
other property. They noted that other property was not
included in the decedent's estate, if he had completely parted
with it, simply because he had paid the consideration for it.
The legislative committee explained that the payment of
premiums was no longer to be a factor in determining taxability of insurance proceeds." It must also be remembered
that Congress removed the test from the place it most logically
41. Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-1(h) (8) (1972).
42. Detroit Bank and Trust Company v. United States, supra note 3, at 969.
43. H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. A136 (1954).
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would go; the section covering the inclusion of life insurance
proceeds in a decedent's gross estate. Further, Congress
rejected attempts to introduce a modified form of the test
back into the Code.
This legislative history suggests that the premium payment test should not be revived under Section 2035 to accomplish the result which Congress sought to eliminate in Section
2042.
The decision in Detroit Bank and Trust can not reasonably be based on Revenue Ruling 71-497, on the nature of the
interest transferred, or on congressional intent. Even the
court admitted this when they stated that a "technical construction" of the law would lead them to a different result.44
The mere fact that a tax break may result from the deletion
of the premium payment test does not justify a judicial closing of this loophole. This is an area of exclusive congressional jurisdiction and the courts, together with the Treasury
Department, should stop encroaching upon this power.
WILLIAM J.

CLABE

44. Detroit Bank and Trust Company v. United State%, supra note 3, at 969.
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